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Congress Says "Da" on Nuclear Arms for Germany

Even the Supreme Soviet in Moscow could hardly rubber-stamp party line with more alacrity than did the Congress of the United States in approving the Pentagon's party line on the wisdom of spreading nuclear arms to our allies, particularly to the Germans. Never was a more momentous decision taken with less discussion. In the House a handful of rebels led by Meyer of Vermont had put in resolutions to block the nuclear sharing agreements but the House Rules Committee refused to report them out and Speaker Rayburn refused to recognize Congressman Meyer for a unanimous consent request. Meyer and Byron Johnson (*D. Col.*) were allowed a few remarks in protest on July 16 covering little more than a single page of the Congressional Record. Though 40 members of the House had signed a letter asking for discussion of the agreements, the leadership steam-roller applied gag rule.

Senate Worse Than The House

The Senate next day provided a worse spectacle. Not a single Senator dared introduce a resolution to block any of the agreements. Senator Humphrey had gone so far as to raise some questions (which we reprinted in last week's issue). He took the floor on July 17 to stultify himself by answering the questions to his own satisfaction and throwing in the sponge. Morse spoke up and said he had so many reservations about the agreements he wasn't sure he would vote for them. Apparently he was unaware that the law is so rigged that no vote to confirm these treaties-disguised-as-executive-agreements is required and that no concurrent resolution to block them within the 60-day deadline was before the Senate. Church of Idaho expressed some misgivings and exchanged flowery compliments with Humphrey; the latter even compared Church with Borah, thus laying it on with an over-size shovel. The other liberals in the Senate, apprised in advance that Humphrey would speak on the nuclear agreements, were discreetly silent or absent.

An anthology of fatuity could be compiled from Humphrey's speech answering his own questions. While he recognized at one point that the nuclear sharing agreements are part of a series of steps which may take the world "just a little closer to the day of ultimate war," he soon hastened to say that on the other hand these agreements "could actually help chances for a test ban" by stepping up pressure on the Russians. This theory of pressure for peace by speeding up the arms race has long been the favorite rationalization of bipartisan foreign policy. If Humphrey believes it, why has he been leading the fight for disarmament? If he is for disarmament, why does he year after year give in so easily on the greatest obstacle to it—the various steps to rearm the Germans with nuclear weapons? Humphrey's final question to himself was whether the people of Western Europe wanted nuclear weapons. He assured himself that the State Department had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session that "the people welcome them." This will be news in England, where the British Labor Party is deeply split over the issue; in Germany, where the Social Democrats and the labor movement are opposed to nuclear weapons; in Greece, where the opposition parties have so far blocked acceptance of nuclear missile bases.

The extent to which our military bureaucracy takes control of Congress for granted was revealed July 23 when the House Appropriations Committee made public its hearings on Mutual Security. These showed that an Assistant Secretary of Defense in executive session on June 3 and Gen. Lauris Norstad on June 8 explained that by the end of this calendar year they would have nuclear missiles and other "advanced weapons" in the hands of ten NATO powers—Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey. No such agreements had yet been approved. The British, French, German, Dutch, Turkish and Greek pacts were still before Congress. The Norwegian, Danish, Belgian and Italian agreements have not yet been submitted to it. Yet all of them, and their approval, were taken for granted. Krushchev could not be more sure of his Supreme Soviet than our Generals are of Congress.

The next step will come next year. Congress will be asked to amend the Atomic Energy Act to hand over the nuclear warheads to our allies. Friends of peace had better start getting ready early to fight that one.

Reformed Radical

John Strachey, author of the pre-war Coming Struggle for Power, whom the State Department tried to bar in the 30's as a dangerous radical, is here again but this time on a tour arranged and financed by the State Department. Now a right-wing British Laborite, and a prospective War Minister, Strachey lobbied privately in Washington liberal circles in favor of the nuclear arms sharing agreements. Strachey explained that the Labor Party's proposal for a non-nuclear club of nations (other than the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) calls only for renouncing the production, not the use, of nuclear weapons, and assumes the U.S. would supply these arms to its allies. There is a growing demand in the rank-and-file of British Labor for unilateral renunciation of thermonuclear weapons. The London Economist (June 27) cynically and approvingly described adoption by the leadership of the non-nuclear club idea as "a ruse for baffling the unilateral disarmers."

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Majority Leader McCormack Chimes In On Approving First Strike Strategy

Holifield Joins Nelson Rockefeller in Build-Up for Preventive War

Congressman Chet Holifield (*D. Cal.*) this year has joined Nelson Rockefeller, the AEC and certain elements of the Pentagon in spreading the idea that nuclear war can be kept neatly limited, and that we may therefore threaten nuclear war if necessary.

Holifield made a major speech on this theme before the House July 15. He began by reading the introductory section of the report to Governor Rockefeller on a fallout shelter program with its complacent assurance that "if a test of military strength" become necessary "our people and our democratic society can be successfully defended" and its hint that a shelter program would increase "the sense of purpose of our negotiators at the international conference tables." Holifield differs from Rockefeller only in arguing that the shelter program should be financed by the Federal government.

Fears We May Deter Ourselves

Holifield said he was not espousing preventive or pre-emptive war but his reasoning leads straight in that direction. After mentioning the Quemoy and Lebanon crises of last year, he said, "our deterrent striking force is also designed to prevent small-scale aggression or even extremely provocative behavior on the part of the Soiet Union" but "if the launching of our attacking forces will mean inevitable destruction of our Nation by a counter blow from the Soviet Union, we ourselves will be deterred from using such an extreme measure." This means he envisages the use of nuclear striking power, not as a last-resort of defense, but as a means of enforcing our will politically. In the Lebanese-Iraqi crisis, which dissolved without war, this route would have culminated in a disastrous nuclear exchange between U.S. and U.S.S.R.

The point Holifield was making became clearer when Majority Leader McCormack of Massachusetts interjected, "While we should not adopt a policy of a surprise attack, certainly it seems to me we should get away from the policy of non attack under any circumstances." Mr. Holifield agreed that "a policy of massive retaliation after attack is a completely fallacious doctrine." Holifield made his real position plain when he said, "In other words, unless we are clearly willing to use, in extreme necessity, our deterrent striking force, that force is not really a deterrent." This is the philosophy of preventive nuclear war.

Holifield's optimistic adventurism is based on the loaded assumptions and the unreliable figures of his recent nuclear war hearings. He admitted in passing that in arriving at his figures, "We chose a limited attack". But he is not willing to discuss what would happen if the nuclear first strike he proposes unleashed a total war. He quotes the less revealing portions of the Rand report (but not those in the box above). He has failed to explain why his figures assume only 50,000,000 dead from an attack of 1,446 megatons on the United States while the Rand study estimated 90,000,000 from a 1500-megaton attack. Nor has he ever discussed the other, more realistic Rand estimate of a 20,000 megaton attack, with 160 million deaths.

The idea that nuclear war can be limited is folly. The notion that it might ever be wise to initiate it is criminal. The belief that fallout shelters could save the life we know and the country we love is a delusion. There is now no sane alternative to peace, but the search for it is hard and to challenge the military cave-man mind takes courage.

To Make It Easier to Gamble With Our Lives

"This study was initiated in the belief that non-military defense measures . . . might make two significant contributions to the national defense. First, they might alleviate the catastrophe of a nuclear attack. . . . Second, they might increase U. S. freedom of action . . . willingness to make foreign policy decisions carrying a risk of war may be important to meet major Soviet challenges. . . . Deterrence of extremely provocative enemy behavior other than a direct attack on the United States might thus be maintained as a credible national policy . . . we cannot rule out the possibility that the United States, faced with a major Soviet challenge, might sometime be forced to resist militarily, even at the risk of devastation. . . . Control of the military situation could be more quickly seized . . . if the United States were compelled to launch an attack. . . .

"Warning measured in terms of days is possible if nuclear attack occurs as an extension of a local war, or after a period of severe international tension, or as a last-resort decision by the United States. . . . Strategic evacuation would then be possible. . . . A dramatic and unequivocal signal, such as exploding a small atomic weapon at a very high altitude over the city, would help in getting people to move quickly."

—The Rand Corp. (Herman Kahn) Report on A Study of Non-Military Defense, pps. 1-9.

City Plan Experts Says Fallout Shelters Would Be Tombs in A Real Atom War

"It is incredible that Governor Rockefeller and his Special Task Force on Protection from Radioactive Fallout have come to the conclusion that the people of the State of New York should build thick-walled protective shelters. This is either an astonishing display of ignorance, an attempt to stiffen our resolve in the cold war, or perhaps to give us a sense of security.

"The concept of fall-out shelters has validity only in an 'exercise war'—a war which produces fewer casualties in the entire state than would be sustained from a single 20-megaton hydrogen bomb exploded over New York City. The probable cause of a real war will be far different. . . . If our cities are attacked, our enemy will send dozens of big bombs against a city like New York. . . .

"The fall-out shelter program would only be useful against radiation fallout. Such shelters do not protect from heat and blast effects. They serve only as tombs . . . if our cities are attacked, there are very few people who will survive the blasts and heat effects.

"It cannot be an exercise war—it will either be annihilative or it will not start. Once started, it cannot stop—there will be . . . no house doctor to call a technical knock-out. The few unlucky ones remaining alive would not have long to live."

—Walter Thabit, formerly of the Baltimore City Planning Dept., Letter to the New York Times, July 20.

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Sharp Questions Cut Through Double Talk to Some Startling Admissions

Have We Enough Bombs in Our Stockpile Now to Destroy the World?

We provide here some glimpses of the hearings released July 17 by the House Appropriations Committee on the AEC 1960 budget. This committee under Clarence Cannon is much more searching than the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which (except for Chairman Anderson) has become a toothless watchdog. This deals with bomb stocks:

MR. CANNON (*D. Mo.*): We are continuing to add to our stockpile . . . if we can only use a certain amount without jeopardizing the life of this generation and the coming generations, when we reach that level in our stockpile would it be advisable to stop? . . .

MR. MCCONE: With respect to the first part of your question, your conjecture of the possibility that a nuclear war might create an environment in which mankind could not exist, growing out of the Neville Shute book, 'On the Beach', a year or two ago, the studies that have been conducted recently have indicated despite—

MR. CANNON. Off the record. (Discussion off the record).

MR. MCCONE: Despite the effects of the nuclear war on the countries that are involved and the less serious but still serious effects on the countries immediately adjoining them, the balance of the world would not be disastrously affected.

MR. CANNON: Only the combatants would be disastrously affected?

MR. MCCONE: The combatant countries would be disastrously affected. The countries immediately adjoining would be affected seriously but the distant countries would not be affected seriously.

MR. CANNON: In that event, we might wind up with a world population limited to the inhabitants of Tibet.

MR. MCCONE: Yes, and the South Americans might get along all right. You could imagine a situation like that.

MR. CANNON: Well, that is a practical question. If there is a limit, and scientists tell us there is a limit beyond which we cannot go without destruction, why should we not determine where that line of demarcation is and stop there?

MR. MCCONE: I think that is a very good question, sir. . . . Now, if you are building for a single purpose, such as the strategic counteroffensive, there would be a limit, and you would say that limit would be probably enough. Maybe some military planners would not agree, but it would be my opinion that you would reach that point. However, we find as weapons become smaller and different configurations they are useful in a variety of ways. . . . As a consequence, the requirements are shifting now, so you are meeting the needs of these various weapons systems. . . .

MR. CANNON: If you limit this to bombs, the accumulation of stockpiles for enemy destruction, isn't there a limit of reserves beyond which we need not go because to go beyond that limit would be to produce a supply of bombs which cannot be used without certain destruction. What about that?

MR. MCCONE: Yes, I would think there would be a limit.

MR. CANNON: Have you in your cooperation with the Defense Department discussed that limit?

MR. MCCONE: No, we have discussed their future requirements . . . for the next four years.

MR. CANNON: I don't know that it would be a matter of requirement. It would be a matter of tolerance. It would be a matter of how much we could detonate without injury to the human race. . . . Now, do you produce more for our stockpile or our reserves than we dare use?

MR. MCCONE: I do not think that that is a situation that we are approaching. Perhaps General [A.D.] Starbird (Director, AEC Military Application Division), who is much closer to the actual planning figures than I am could comment on that.

MR. CANNON: I would like to ask one question. Do we at this time have more bombs than we could safely detonate in a month? In a week? In a day?

GENERAL STARBIRD: Considering what we believe could be delivered, I believe the answer is 'No.'

MR. CANNON: We have not reached a point where we could at this time explode everything we have in stock, being everything we have in reserve, and still it would not be sufficient to imperil the race?

GENERAL STARBIRD: I said considering what we could expect to deliver.

Memorable Admission from McCone on Testing

Mr. McCONE: I have reached two conclusions in my mind. One is that all of the tests conducted to date, the Soviets and the British and ours, have not created . . . consequent fallout that appears to offer serious danger to the people of this country or the world. Secondly, it is my opinion that if testing were to continue unrestricted for a period of years, a very serious situation might result. . . .

We feel that if . . . we are to be deprived of these developments because of a restriction on testing, then we must be sure that the Soviets are likewise deprived of an opportunity of development themselves. We have no ambition to develop these means of destruction just for the purpose of developing them. If we felt that no one was proceeding, then it might be a good thing from the standpoint of the world situation for everybody to stop. —*Hse. App. Com. AEC Hearings*

Armament Salesmen on Both Sides Exaggerate Each Other's Achievements

Mr. CANNON: What do we know, Admiral Rickover, about the progress being made by Russia in these various fields, in the nuclear propelled ship, and the proposed nuclear propelled airplane?

Admiral RICKOVER: I will take the nuclear airplane first, sir. I think they have done a good job of copying our propaganda. Now we are copying their propaganda. If you read their propaganda carefully, it is almost a verbatim copy of the stuff that some of our people put out. I think it is an interchange between groups in both countries that are interested in doing that job and getting funds. . . .

The stories you hear coming from individuals and contractors in the United States depend on what they are trying to sell. For example, if an industrial organization is interested in building more or different types of atomic submarines or parts of them, they come out and make statements that the Russians are doing this or that, and that it is essential to our national defense to embark immediately on what they recommend.

—*House Appr. Com. AEC Hearings, released July 17.*

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Affair for Favored Few Reporters Discloses the Old Familiar Rigidity

Ike at "Off the Record" Dinner Shows He Prefers Drift to the Brink

The stories in the afternoon papers of July 21 and the morning papers of July 22 purporting to explain what the President is thinking, as disclosed by an anonymous "high source", were based on an "off the record" dinner given by Mr. Eisenhower at the White House the night of July 20. Fourteen correspondents were invited, including all those regularly assigned to the White House beat, and Mr. Eisenhower said he might hold similar get-togethers with the press again. These off-the-record affairs enlighten the press but confuse the public.

There will be a temptation to read too much into this new off-the-record affair by those who pore over every scrap of information in an effort to solve the riddle of the Geneva talks. Little if anything was disclosed that was not known before, but what came out of the talk emphasized the danger. Mr. Eisenhower recognized that the Russians are against reunifying Germany because they fear a strong resurgent Reich, yet we go ahead with German nuclear rearmament. He recognized that small incidents over Berlin may easily lead to a war neither great Power wants, and that this would be an all-out nuclear war, but he is still unwilling to sit down and talk with Krushchev unless the latter first signs on the dotted line at Geneva. To recognize Western occupation rights in Berlin permanently, i.e. until that millennial day when Germany is reunified, would be a major concession Krushchev might make to Eisenhower at a summit conference as part of a general settlement but which we can hardly get from Gromyko as the mere price of admission to the White House. The Eisenhower attitude means that he would risk those small incidents which might trigger World War III rather than explore every possibility for a settlement first. This is drifting brinkmanship.

Franco and Castro

The Mutual Security hearings by House Appropriations released July 23 show total aid to Franco Spain through June 30 of this year was $1,254,000,000. His shaky regime has now been bolstered by $375,000,000 in public and private credits and admission to the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation). A powerful pro-Franco lobby orchestrates his praises in Congress, which are led by Walter of the Un-American Activities Committee. (Apparently Fascism is not "un-American".) Latin America will contrast this with whipped up Congressional hostility to Castro, led by Eastland, Trujillo's friend, and such Senators as Dodd of Connecticut. Despite the President's tactful disclaimer at a recent press conference of any wish to smear Castro as Red, a remark which did our country a lot good in Latin America, the Spanish speaking world will conclude the U. S. prefers Fascist dictators. When the chips are down Congress stands with the U. S. sugar companies against Cuban freedom and agrarian reform.

One Way to Make A Correction

"The inner circle of the American government has been shaken and alarmed by a 'Hitler-like' interview given to Harriman by Krushchev."

—Joseph Alsop's column, July 2

"Mr. Harriman, talking to The Star from Bonn, denied the 'rough talk' story categorically . . . 'sounds like a botched up leak from the State Department . . . anything you say to the State Department comes out the other end like sausage meat.'"

—Washington Sunday Star, July 5

"Harriman greatly diluted his published accounts of his Krushchev interview, and deplored Washington's description of this interview as 'Hitler-like.' He feared impairment of his ability to negotiate with the Kremlin. . . . It is also true that Krushchev does not resemble Hitler, in the sense of positively wanting war. But Krushchev's tactics most certainly resemble Hitler's tactics. . . . Equally certain. . . ."

—Joseph Alsop's column, July 20

In Tribute to Eugene Meyer

When Eugene Meyer, a multimillionaire associate of Herbert Hoover, bought the Washington Post in 1933, no one dreamed that he would turn it into an enlightened liberal paper. Mr. Meyer grew more liberal as he grew older, and he treated newspaper publishing as a public service, not a business. We salute his passing.

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